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PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:
DIFFUSION OF MANAGERIAL STRUCTURE AND
FRAGMENTATION OF BARGAINING UNITS
CURTIS L. MACK*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is becoming increasingly clear that collective bargaining in the
public sector has not functioned as smoothly as it has in the private
sector. Perhaps the two major factors that have interfered with and
impeded public sector collective bargaining are the diffusion of
managerial authority at the state and local level and the excessive
fragmentation of bargaining units.'
In the private sector an employer is obligated to bargain with the
majority union with respect to all matters affecting the terms and con-
ditions of employment of the represented employees. 2 And, in the
private sector, the obligation to bargain poses little problem because
the employer, or its agent at the bargaining table, is usually the only
source of authority that can effect any change in working conditions;
accordingly, any agreement between an employer and a majority union
becomes the "Law of the Shop." However, the premise that the bar-
gaining agent or the employer who is obligated to bargain with the
union has the exclusive authority to bargain with regard to all working
conditions does not find support in the public sector. For example, the
employing entity in the public sector may be the local school district or
the local police department, which, under the applicable collective
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.A., Michigan State University,
1967; J.D., University of Akron, 1970; LL.M., University of Michigan, 1973.
1. While public sector labor relations encompasses federal, state and municipal
employees, this article will discuss the problem only as it relates to municipal employees
and their employers; however, the reader should note that the problems discussed herein
are not unique to labor relations at the municipal level, but are prevalent at the state
and national level as well.
2. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970), provides that
to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer
and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer
in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising there-
under, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party . ...
The Act also states that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse
to bargain collectively with a union chosen by a majority of the employees. 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(5) (1970). For cases construing these cornerstone provisions of private sector
collective bargaining, see, e.g., Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203
(1964); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1969).
282 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.2:281
bargaining statute, is obligated to bargain with the union. Yet, there
are other segments of government, created by legislative fiat, that
without first consulting the employing entity or the majority union
enjoy power to promulgate rules and regulations which can, and often
do, affect working conditions.
These legislatively-created agencies include the state civil service
commission, budgeting departments and other municipal and state
legislative arms, each having authority to alter existing work practices
that the unions have secured with valid collective bargaining agree-
ments. The term "absent employers" may be used to characterize
governmental agencies with authority to enact or change rules and
regulations that affect the terms and conditions of employment, but
without the concomitant obligation to bargain with the majority
union. Since "absent employers" exist in a majority of the states,
it may be concluded that the resulting diffusion of managerial authority
has substantially inhibited collective bargaining in the public sector.
With neither the "real employers" 3 nor the unions precisely knowing
their respective rights and obligations, the resulting uncertainty raises
serious problems in the areas of contract negotiation, scope of bargain-
ing and contract administration. Several ramifications of the problems
raised in these areas will be discussed in the first part of this article.
The second factor that has adversely affected collective bargaining
in the public sector is fragmentation of bargaining units. In both the
private and public sector "unit determination" is of vital importance.
It is important to the unions and the employers because
[i]n the private sector, it is clear that the scope and nature of the unit
found to be appropriate for bargaining has acted as an important
determinant of the union's basic economic strength-that is, its bar-
gaining over bread-and-butter economic issues. In the public sector,
it seems clear that the scope and nature of the unit found to be ap-
propriate will also affect the range of subjects which can be negotiat-
ed meaningfully, the role played in the process by the separate
branches of government, the likelihood of peaceful resolution of
disputes, order versus chaos in bargaining, and ultimately, perhaps,
the success of the whole idea of collective bargaining for public
employees. 4
Moreover, an improper unit determination can adversely affect the
employer's use of its human resources. If the unit is defined too
3. For the purpose of this article "real employer" refers to the governmental entity
that is obligated by statute to bargain with the union.
4. Rock, The Appropriate Unit Question in the Public Service: The Problem of
Proliferation, 67 MicH. L. REv. 1001 (1969).
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narrowly, for example, the employer may encounter problems in
promoting employees to higher paying positions or in complying with
Title VII mandates to upgrade minority employees.
Despite the existence of factors that seem to favor a broad bargain-
ing unit, some public employers have opted for small units.5 The re-
sult has been to carve several bargaining units out of a group of em-
ployees which logically should be included in one broad unit. Per-
haps public employers have viewed unit fragmentation as one method
of minimizing the bargaining strength of the union; for them, unit
fragmentation has served as an anti-union device, deliberately develop-
ed. The second part of this article will discuss the problems inherent
in unit fragmentation, and will indicate how the doctrine has been
used by unions against the employers who created it. Initially, how-
ever, some brief comments regarding the historic factors which gave
rise to public sector unionism are required.
The Rise of Unionism in the Public Sector
The right to engage in collective bargaining in the private sector
has been well established for more than a quarter of a century. 6 In
some quarters, however, the right to engage in collective bargaining in
the public sector remains debatable. In fact, many public officials are
unwilling to devise a bargaining scheme that will permit collective
bargaining to become a reality for public employees. 7 But the failure
by most state legislatures to accord public employees the same bargain-
5. The City of Milwaukee, for example, has separate units of nurses, physicians,
dentists, engineers and psychiatric personnel. The units range in size from 2,800 em-
ployees of the Department of Public Works to four employees of the Election Commission.
Shaw & Clark, Determination oj Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Public Sector:
Legal and Practical Problems, 51 ORE. L. REV. 152, 155 (1971).
6. For a historical development of the private employee's right to bargain collectively,
see A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POuCY (1960); F. FRANKFURTMR & N. GRENE,
THE LABOR INJUNCIrION (1930); H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER AcT TO
TAFT-HARTLEY (1950); H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS (1968). For a
compilation, with commentary, of the federal legislation establishing the private sector
employees' right to bargain, see STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: LABOR
ORGANIZATION (R. Koretz ed. 1970).
7. See Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969),
where the state supreme court cautioned the legislature that its failure to enact an ap-
propriate public sector labor relations statute would compel the court to devise a bar-
gaining scheme. The court subsequently appointed the Supreme Court Public Employees'
Rights Commission to suggest interim guidelines for the implementation of collective
bargaining for public employees until such time as the legislature acted to fulfill the
mandate of the state constitution. See City of Miami Springs v. State ex rel. Fraternal
Order of Police, Lodge No. 11, Case No. 43,454 (Fla., Nov. 28, 1973) (order appointing
commission). The provision in the state constitution places public employees' right to
bargain on an equal basis with that of private employees. See FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
19741
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ing rights enjoyed by their brethren in the private sector has not
acted as a deterrent to the growth of public sector unionism. In recent
years, the growth of unionism in the public sector has far exceeded
that occurring in the private sector. 8 Consequently, this rapid growth
has compelled many public officials to cast aside outdated notions that
labor unions and collective bargaining are at variance with efficient
government and, therefore, detrimental to the political process. 9 To
date, more than thirty-four states have enacted some type of bargain-
ing scheme permitting public employees to engage in collective bar-
gaining.10
In addition to expressing open hostility to public sector unionism,
many public officials have been of the opinion that public employees
have little or no need to organize and bargain collectively." They have
8. An examination of the statistics indicates the rapid growth in public sector
unionism. At the end of 1971, there were over 2.6 million members in state and local
unions as compared to 1 million in 1960. The net increase of members in all unions,
public and private, was 1.8 million persons between 1958 and 1968. Of this number,
over 1 million were public sector employees. Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations
Law in the Public Sector, 10 DUQ. L. REV. 357 (1972). See also 2 ABA LABOR RELATIONS
LAW 251-77 (1972); Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports on Public Employment
Labor Legislation: A Comparative Analysis, 67 MICH. L. REv. 891, 918 (1969).
9. For an example of the initial, now discredited, judicial treatment of public em-
ployee bargaining, see Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 71 N.E.2d 246, 254 (1947), where
the court held:
There is no authority for the delegation either by the municipality or the civil
service appointees of any functions to any organization of any kind. Each tub
must stand on its bottom. The law provides for the election and appointment of
officials whose duties would be interfered with by the intrusion of outside organi-
zations.
10. For an exhaustive compilation of the state statutes, see Blair, State Legislative
Control Over the Conditions of Public Employment: Defining the Scope of Collective
Bargaining for State and Municipal Employees, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3-4 n.18 (1973).
The structure of public employee collective bargaining varies throughout the states. The
statutes may be divided into two general groups: "collective negotiations" and "meet
and confer" statutes. The former more closely approximate the definitions and duty to
bargain found in the NLRA. The "meet and confer" statutes permit more discretion
on the part of the public employer and consequently the parties do not meet as equals
at the bargaining table. For a comprehensive examination of the differing types of
statutes, see Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L.
REv. 885, 895-99 (1973); Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public
Sector, 10 DuQ. L. REv. 357, 365-73 (1972). A majority of the statutes define "bargaining"
as a good faith attempt to resolve differences. See statutes compiled in Blair, supra at 3-4
n.18.
11. Any attempt by public employees to organize and bargain collectively with
their employers was viewed as detrimental to the sovereign and constituted grounds for
the employees' discharge. 1959 Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 059-164; 1966 Ind. Att'y Gen. Op.
144; 1946 Ind. Att'y Gen. Op. 224. See also Fellows v. LaTronica, 377 P.2d 547 (Colo.
1962); Board of Regents v. Packing House Workers Local 1258, 175 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa
1970); City of Springfield v. Clouse, 206 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1947). But cf. McLaughlin
v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968), which held that public employees have a
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assumed incorrectly that the well-being of public employees is a con-
cern of the states and not of the unions. This protective attitude
eventually led to the creation and expansion of the role of state civil
service commissions. 12 Thus, in addition to their traditional functions,
civil service commissions were further vested with the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations pertaining to both wages and condi-
tions of employment. It became increasingly clear, however, that the
roles of the civil service commissions and other state agencies were
and continue to be in direct conflict with the concept of collective
bargaining. Furthermore, there are some state statutes and ordinances
in direct conflict with the collective bargaining statute'
II. WHO Is OBLIGATED BY STATUTE To BARGAIN?
The inability of unions, state labor boards and the courts to identify
readily the "real employer" is one of the major problems in public
sector collective bargaining. 14 It is virtually impossible to define, with
any meaningful certainty, the employer's obligation to bargain or the
constitutional right under the first amendment to form, join or support a labor organiza-
tion.
12. Around the turn of the 20th century, many political reformers were of the
opinion that civil service legislation was necessary to eliminate the spoil and political
patronage involved in public employment. They believed that hiring, promoting and
conditions of employment should be determined on individual merits and qualifications,
not political affiliation. Moreover, it was felt that public employees should be protected
from politics. R. HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 168-183 (1963).
During the 1930's the public sector unions supported the civil service systems. Project:
Collective Bargaining and Politics in Public Employment, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 887, 917
(1972). However, as labor unions increased their numbers and received recognition from
public employers as the lawful bargaining agents for public employees, civil service sys-
tems came to be viewed unfavorably. Stanley, What Are Unions Doing to Merit Systems,
31 PUB. PERSONNEL REV. 108 (1970); Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bar-
gaining in Public Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805, 861 (1970). They point out that "[n]ot
infrequently, however, the civil service has become encrusted with bureaucratic barnacles,
and frequently its administration complicates the achievement of a rational regime of
collective bargaining." Id. at 861. This problem has been resolved in Michigan. In
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Board of Supervisors, 184 N.W.2d 201 (Mich. 1971), the court held
that the collective bargaining statute had precedence over any civil service rules or regula-
tions pertaining to collective bargaining.
13. E.g., Michigan Home Rule Cities Act, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 117.1-.38
(1967), as amended, (Supp. 1973). See also City of Flint, 5 Michigan Employment Rela-
tions Commission Labor Opinions 348, 360 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Mich. E.R.C.
Lab. Op.]; City of Detroit, 6 Mich. E.R.C. Lab. Op. 237 (1971). Despite a specific
statutory provision giving precedence to all state statutes or ordinances in conflict with
the collective bargaining statute, see MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 178N (Supp. 1972),
the Massachusetts courts have used a case-by-case approach to give meaning to the
collective bargaining provisions. Norton Teachers Ass'n v. Town of Norton, 279 N.E.2d
659 (Mass. 1972); Mendes v. City of Taunton, 303 N.E.2d 131 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973).
14. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.81(16) (Supp. 1973), which defines the employer
only as the State of Wisconsin.
1974)
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scope of bargaining until the employer is identified. Without some
clarification, a statutory mandate purporting to obligate the employer
to bargain in good faith with the union, concerning wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment, will remain an illusion.
Managerial authority in the public sector is diffused: several in-
dependent arms of government are legally obligated to effect terms
and conditions of employment. For example, the immediate employers
(sheriffs, judges, fire chiefs or department heads) must determine
non-economic aspects of working conditions such as reporting time,
vacation, workload, hiring and firing, and methods by which the work
will be performed. The city mayor must then formulate the overall
budget for the entire governmental unit, and the city legislative body
ultimately must appropriate funds to implement any bargained-for
wage increases. 15 This multi-faceted procedure raises the question of
which of these entities is obligated to bargain with the union. Does
the obligation attach to the legislative body, the mayor or the head
of each department?
Since a majority of the state statutes define bargaining as a good
faith attempt by unions and employers to resolve their differences, a
statutory definition of the "real employer" is essential in determining
which of the governmental entities is statutorily mandated to bargain.
As Professor Edwards has observed: "One element of good faith bar-
gaining is the presence of bargaining representatives on both sides of
the negotiating table who have the authority to make genuine pro-
posals."' 16 Consequently, there can be no good faith negotiations "if
the representative of the public employer lacks even the authority to
arrive at a conditional agreement."'' 7 One approach to the problem
might well be a determination that the separate entities are engaged
in the joint venture of carrying out the mission of the municipality
and are, therefore, joint employers for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining. Thus, all would be obliged to bargain in good faith.
In spite of the problems arising in the absence of a concise statutory
definition of the "real employer," a majority of the state legislatures
still have failed to provide either definite answers or suggestive guide-
lines.' Rather, they continue to assume erroneously that, after the
15. See City of Detroit, 6 Mich. E.R.C. Lab. Op. 237 (1971).
16. Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REV.
885, 904 (1973).
17. Id.
18. A recent amendment to Michigan's statutes defines the employer as "a person
. .. and includes any person acting as an agent of an employer." MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 425.2F (Supp. 1973). This new statute does not help to alleviate the problem
faced in Board of Comm'rs, GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT No. 408, at
B-1 (Mich. E.R.C., June 4, 1971) [hereinafter cited as G.E.R.R.]. See pp. 287-88 infra.
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bargaining obligation is set forth, the inclusion of the word "employer"
in the statute provides sufficient clarity. They further assume that any
problem arising because of statutory vagueness can be resolved through
state labor boards and state courts that rely on the private sector's
definitions of "employer."
The assumption that state labor boards and state courts can secure
guidance by looking to the private sector's model does not survive
careful scrutiny, since the latter's definition of employer is of dubious
value in the public sector: that definition neither compels nor suggests
an answer to the question of to whom does the bargaining obligation
attach. The overlapping functions of many state and municipal arms
of government forestall comparisons between the use of the term
"employer" in the public and private sectors. For example, in the
private sector the bargaining obligation is placed upon the employing
entity that has the ultimate "authority to hire, discipline, and dis-
charge" the employees;19 but, in the public sector, a determination of
who has the authority to hire, discipline and discharge is not disposi-
tive of the issue. A definitive conclusion cannot be reached until it is
determined which of the municipal entities has the authority under
general state law to promulgate rules and regulations pertaining to
the matter in dispute. The question then becomes whether the term
"employer" in the public sector, by implication, refers to "the de-
cision-making authorities of government, both the legislative and
executive, who can grant or deny what the union wants. '' 20 If answered
positively, the good faith obligation would attach to the "legislative
body enacting a pension plan, or the park superintendent approving
a change in work shifts, or a foreman settling a minor grievance. "
21
The need for a legislative definition of employer is well illustrated
by Monroe County Board of Commissioners,22 decided by the Michigan
Employment Relations Commission (MERC). There, the county
commissioners commenced negotiation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment with the union covering all county employees, including non-
judicial employees working for the courts. Ignoring MERC's prior
determination that the appropriate unit was county-wide, the judges
took the position that the county commissioners lacked the authority
to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement for individuals em-
19. See Musicians Local 802, 176 N.L.R.B. 198, 199 (1969); accord, Musicians Local
802, 171 N.L.R.B. 1100 (1968).
20. D. STANLEY & C. COOPER, MANAGING LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER UNION PRESSURE
20 (1972).
21. Id.
22. G.E.R.R. No. 408, at B-1 (Mich, E.R.C., June 4, 1971).
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ployed by the court.2 3 On that basis, the judges ordered the commission-
ers to cease negotiating with the union regarding matters affecting in-
dividuals so employed. The commissioners subsequently refused to
negotiate with the union with respect to matters affecting non-judicial
court personnel. Charging the commissioners with bad-faith bargain-
ing, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge. MERC held that
the county was the sole employer of all employees, including those
employed by the courts, and that the commissioners were, therefore,
obligated to bargain with the union.2 4
The decision reached by MERC evinces almost total disregard
for the non-economic issues involved in collective bargaining. MERC
reasoned that any collective bargaining agreement could obligate the
employer to pay higher wages and that only the county commission-
ers, as the legislative body, could appropriate the funds required to
implement the agreement.25 Thus MERC held that only the legislative
arm of a county was statutorily obligated to participate in the bargain-
ing process.28
The agency emphasized that, "unless the entity supplying the
funds is at the bargaining table and has ultimate responsibility for
carrying out any agreement reached," 27 collective bargaining would
be meaningless to the employees. Thus, MERC concluded that the
county, not the court or the judges, was the employer and that to hold
otherwise would separate contract negotiation from contract adminis-
tration. The resulting decision thus relegated the judges to the status
of supervisors or "official" onlookers.2
In Monroe County MERC attached importance to only one aspect
of collective bargaining: the economic issues. In ignoring the judges'
authority to promulgate rules pertaining to day-to-day working
conditions of their employees, the decision hardly enhances the bar-
gaining process. That the judges do not appropriate funds for salaries
should not necessarily bar them from participating in the bargaining
process. On the contrary, as a matter of both practice and law, the
judges had sole authority over matters fundamental to working condi-
tions. They, not the county commissioners, determined such matters
as work load and the manner in which their employees were required
to perform assigned tasks. Thus, excluding the judges from the bar-
gaining table made effective labor-management relations more difficult.
23. Id.
24. Id. at B-3.
25. Id. at B-2.
26. Id.
27. Id. at B-3.
28. Id.
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A more practical and sound decision would have held that the county
commissioners and the court were joint employers, thereby obligat-
ing both entities to bargain in good faith with the union. Such a re-
sult also would have enabled other departments within the county (un-
able, like judges, to order a cessation in bargaining) to claim coequal
status with the judges and county commissioners as employers. In that
case, requiring the union to participate in bifurcated bargaining with
the departments for working conditions and with the commission for
wages and benefits would not appear unreasonable.
The practicality of the joint-employers approach is best illustrated
in County of Ulster v. Civil Service Employees Association.2 9 The New
York Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), relying on two
factors-financial control and day-to-day supervision of the represent-
ed employees-identified both the county and its sheriff as employers.
The appellate court observed that, though the county provided the
operating funds for the sheriff's office, the employees were "hired and
fired by the sheriff, and he determined all terms and conditions of their
employment other than salary, such as work assignments, work
schedules, time off and overtime." 3° Hence, the court found in this
ample support for PERB's finding of joint employers.
The decision by the New York court correctly places the good
faith bargaining obligation on both parties; accordingly, they are both
obligated to approach the negotiating table with a sincere desire to
resolve their differences with the union. But, more importantly, PERB
and the court recognized and dealt with the problem of managerial
diffusion.
In view of legislative inaction, the arduous task of resolving con-
flicts that arise from managerial diffusion has been thrust upon state
courts and state labor boards. The decisions reached by the state boards
and courts are inconsistent both from a legal and doctrinal stand-
point. They have attempted to resolve, through the decisional process,
matters that lend themselves to a more effective solution through legis-
lative fiat.3 1
A. The Scope of Bargaining
In the private sector, the scope of bargaining is defined in very
general terms. Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) directs the employer to bargain with the majority union over
29. 326 N.Y.S.2d 706 (App. Div. 1971).
30. Id. at 708.
31. See generally T. KOCHAN, RESOLVING INTERNAL MANAGEMENT CONFLICTS FOR LABOR
NEGOTIATION (Public Employee Relations Library No. 41, 1973); Wellington & Winter,
Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805, 861 (1970).
1974]
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"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 32 With
the bargaining obligation stated in very general terms, management
and labor were unable to decide which matters should be resolved
through collective bargaining and which matters were within the
exclusive prerogative of management. Consequently, clarification was
sought from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).13
In approaching the problem, the Board observed that the issues
confronting the parties were (I) mandatory subjects (those matters
substantially affecting the employees and their job security, and which
were, therefore, embraced in Section 8(d) of the NLRA). 4 and (2) per-
missive subjects (matters having only marginal impact on job security,
and concerning which the employer is not required to bargain).3 5 As
with most general rules, there are exceptions. These exceptions have
evolved as a result of the NLRB's and the federal courts' finding that,
while some matters do have a direct and substantial impact on job
security, they are so complex and subjective that it would be unfair
to compel employers to bargain over them with the unions. In this
category of purely managerial decisions are issues relating to capital
investments and plant closures.3
6
While the general definition of the scope of bargaining in the
private sector has been useful in that it permits the NLRB and the
courts to decide each case on its peculiar facts, it will not work well
in the public sector where diffusion in managerial structure and in-
ability to identify employers effectively prevent useful comparisons be-
tween the two models.
Identifying the "real employer" is a prerequisite to defining the
scope of bargaining. In the public sector, for example, matters which
fit neatly into the private sector's definition of mandatory subjects
may be within the exclusive jurisdiction of a governmental entity
that is not at the bargaining table. Nevertheless, many public labor
boards and state courts have attempted to adopt the private model.
A good example of such an attempt by a state board is the case of
32. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
33. See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); NLRB v. American
Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); Stonewall Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 129 F.2d 629 (5th
Cir. 1942).
34. See, e.g., NLRB v. J.H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1948); Shell Oil
Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1948).
35. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
36. See NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967); accord,
NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965); Jays Foods, Inc. v. NLRB,
292 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1961). Nevertheless, the employer must bargain with the union
over the effects of the decision to close the plant. See General Motors Corp., 77 L.R.R.M.
1537 (1971).
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Westwood Community Schools.37 The Michigan Employment Rela-
tions Commission (MERC) agreed with the union's contention that
the opening day of school was a mandatory subject of collective bar-
gaining and was a term and condition of employment; accordingly,
MERC rejected the school board's argument that to bargain over the
issue would adversely affect the state's desire to educate its children.3 8
This decision was consistent with MERC's earlier holding that man-
datory subjects of collective bargaining included vacations and holiday
pay for teachers.3 9
While the Michigan approach in Westwood is consistent with the
private model'4 some states have rejected the NLRB's definition of
mandatory subjects. In doing so, these states have attempted to rest
their decisions on rather subtle and insignificant language contained
in their state statutes. Education Association v. Decourcy4l illustrates
this approach. In Decourcy, the Connecticut Supreme Court conclud-
ed that neither the length of the school day nor the school year was
a term and condition of employment; consequently, they were not
bargainable issues. In reaching its decision, the court conducted a de-
tailed analysis of the private sector's definition of working conditions
and concluded that under the private model, both issues would be
deemed mandatory subjects.42 The court stressed, however, the absence
of the word "hours" in the state statute, and it noted that such omission
evidenced a legislative intent to place the school day and the school
year beyond the scope of collective bargaining.43
In setting forth the precedential value of its Decourcy decision, the
court held that the test to be applied is whether the matter in dispute
is a term and condition of employment or educational policy.44 Issues
falling in the latter category would not be negotiable. In spite of such
an emphatic enunciation, however, the test stated does not resolve the
problem regarding the scope of bargaining. Rather, it merely restates
the question raised by the parties at the negotiating table: What is a
term and condition of employment?
The circular manner in which the Decourcy test was stated does
not permit the state labor board to decide future disputes with cer-
37. 7 Mich. E.R.C. Lab. Op. 313, 317 (1972).
38. Id. at 317-20.
39. Reese Public School Dist., 2 Mich. E.R.C. Lab. Op. 489 (1967).
40. One commentator suggests that under Westwood, the scope of bargaining in
the public sector may be broader than it is in the private sector. Edwards, supra note
16, at 923.
41. 295 A.2d 526 (Conn. 1972).
42. Id. at 533-34.
43. Id. at 534.
44. Id. at 535-36.
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tainty or consistency. The Decourcy court, relying on its own test,
held that workload and class size were mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining. Indeed, the court dismissed the argument that such issues
were not bargainable with the observation that "the legislative intent
is clear. ' ' 45 The test enunciated by the court, however, is so general
that it could have been used to support an opposite conclusion.
4 6
In the absence of legislative guidance, it is difficult for a state
court or agency to promulgate a general rule broad enough to en-
compass the entire "scope of bargaining" issue. Some states continue
to make the effort. In Labor Relations Board v. Richland School Dis-
trict, 7 the board adopted a very broad test for defining the scope of
bargaining: If the issue in dispute is one that is within the control of a
branch of government that is removed from the bargaining process,
then it is a matter of policy and is not negotiable; on the other hand,
if the dispute concerns an issue within the control of the employing
entity and directly affecting employees, the issue is within the discre-
tion of the local management and is, therefore, subject to the bargain-
ing process. 48 Relying on that test, the board held that matters such as
sick leave, compensation for teachers with occupational diseases, paid
absences for court attendance and paid absences for family illness were
proper subjects of collective bargaining.49
While resolution of both the Michigan and Pennsylvania cases
required the commissions to define the scope of bargaining, that was
not the sole issue raised. The broader issue raised in these cases involved
the extent to which agencies that were not employers within the mean-
ing of the applicable statutes could promulgate rules and regulations
affecting working conditions without bargaining or consulting with
45. Id. at 537.
46. See Board of Educ., 4 N.Y. Pub. Employment Rel. Bd. 3725, aff'd on rehearing,
4 N.Y. Pub. Employment Rel. Bd. 3753 (1971) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.P.E.R.B.] where
PERB held that class size was not a mandatory subject of bargaining. See also City
School District, 4 N.Y.P.E.R.B. 4654 (1971). In that case PERB held:
In determining whether or not a subject is a mandatory subject of negotiations,
it is necessary to strike a proper balance between the duty of government
officials to make decisions directly affecting its basic mission, and the statutory
right of employees to negotiate items which are terms and conditions of employ-
ment.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
On the basis of the above test PERB has held that the number of firemen required
to operate a piece of firefighting equipment is a mandatory subject of bargaining.
C.H.S.D. No. 1, Valley Stream, 5 N.Y.P.E.R.B. 3113 (1972). In City School District,
5 N.Y.P.E.R.B. 3023 (1972), PERB held that the work year was a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining.
47. G.E.R.R. No. 485, at B-3 (Pa. L.R.B. Jan. 8, 1973).
48. Id. at B-4.
49. Id.
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the unions that represented the affected employees. Both the Michigan
and Pennsylvania employers had refused to bargain over certain issues
purportedly because they were within the exclusive regulatory scheme
of other state agencies. Thus, while the scope of bargaining was broad-
ened, neither decision gave the parties any instructions or guidance for
dealing with the absent governmental agencies, such as civil service
commissions or other agencies which enact rules affecting employment
conditions.
The authority of the absent agencies to formulate rules and regu-
lations affecting terms and conditions of employment remained intact.
The Pennsylvania holding obligated only the local school district to
bargain over the discretion retained by it. Consequently, the state
school board still could enact rules and regulations that would deprive
the local board of its discretion over the disputed issue. Moreover, the
Pennsylvania court specifically acknowledged the right of the other
state agencies to remove from the bargaining process certain matters
that pertained to working conditions of the represented employees.50
Thus, it reasoned that matters such as formulation of the budget,
utilization of technology, operational structure, and function and pro-
gression of employees were not within the meaning of "terms and con-
ditions of employment." It cannot be over-emphasized that the right
of a separate agency to control these matters will frustrate collective
bargaining in the public sector. All of the exclusions enumerated in
the Richland case have a direct and substantial impact on working
conditions. Thus, this case offers compelling evidence that Pennsylvania
has not completely adopted the private sector model. Had it done so,
the Pennsylvania Board would have precluded both the immediate
employer and other state agencies from instituting any changes in the
terms and conditions of employment until the matter has been agreed
to by the union or until a valid impasse had been reached.51
That the Michigan Commission has not fully adopted the private
sector's definition of working conditions is also clear. It has specifically
held that an agency that is not required to bargain with a union may
alter terms and conditions of employment. For example, it rejected the
union's contention that a "residency requirement" was within the
50. This action is similar to the Massachusetts statute, which ranks other state
statutes and ordinances above the collective bargaining statute. See MASS. GEN. LAW
ANN. ch. 149, § 178N (Supp. 1972); cf. Norton Teachers Ass'n v. Town of Norton, 279
N.E.2d 659 (Mass. 1972).
51. In NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), the Court held that an impasse occurs
when negotiations between union and employer reach a point where further bargaining
would be fruitless. At that point, the employer may unilaterally institute new terms
and conditions of employment.
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meaning of the term "working conditions." 52 MERC reasoned that
there was no conflict between a municipal ordinance which required
policemen and firemen to live in the city and a valid collective bar-
gaining agreement. The principal objection raised by the union, and
completely disregarded by MERC, was not that the regulation was
inconsistent with a collective bargaining agreement, but that it was
promulgated by the city without consulting the union. This decision
is inconsistent with an earlier decision by MERC.55
The interrelationship between managerial diffusion and the scope
of bargaining in the public sector can be seen in Chief of Police v.
Town of Dracut.5 4 The issue raised in that case was whether the select-
men could revoke or modify a city ordinance which gave the chief
of police the unlimited authority to regulate the working conditions
of police officers employed within the department. After the union
demonstrated its majority status, the chief of police rejected a request
by the selectmen to negotiate with the union. The selectmen then
negotiated a collective bargaining agreement with the union. They
contractually agreed to give priority to seniority when granting vaca-
tions and job preference. The chief then challenged the contract on
the theory that the selectmen had exceeded their authority. In the
court's opinion, a resolution of the dispute required it to harmonize
a statute giving the chief of police the authority to promulgate rules
and regulations within the department and a statute giving the select-
men the authority to negotiate with the union.5 5 In resolving the issue
the court stated:
The several statutes involved in this case do not compel a conclu-
sion that the total authority over the town's police department is
52. City of Highland Park, 7 Mich. E.R.C. Lab. Op. 292 (1972).
53. In City of Detroit, 6 Mich. E.R.C. Lab. Op. 257 (1971), the Commission rejected
the employer's contention that the following items were not mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining: (1) residence requirements for all police officers; (2) recruiting
policies and (3) modifying an existing retirement plan. See also City of Flint, 5 Mich.
E.R.C. Lab. Op. 348 (1970).
54. 258 N.E.2d 531 (Mass. 1970).
55. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 41, § 97A (1971), provides in part:
The chief of police in any such town shall from time to time make suitable
regulations governing the police department, and the officers thereof, subject to
the approval of the selectmen; provided, that such regulations shall become
effective without such approval upon the failure of them to take action thereon
within thirty days after they have been submitted to them by the chief of police.
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, §§ 178F-N (1971), as amended, (Supp. 1972), is
the Massachusetts public employees collective bargaining act. Section 1781 thereof pro-
vides: "In such bargaining other than with an employee organization for school employees,
the municipal employer shall be represented by the chief executive officer."
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vested in either the chief or in the board of selectmen. They give a
measure of authority to each ...
Most of the disputed articles require that the chief give exclusive
consideration to the individual request, personal preference, seniority
and rank of a police officer in determining assignment of duties, shifts,
vacations and leaves of absence. It is probably the practice for chiefs
of police to consider such personal factors in making such decisions,
and to honor them if reasonable, practicable and consistent with
the public interest and proper functioning of the police department.
But, the fact that the chief, in his discretion, may consider these
factors in making such decisions is very different from a contractual
obligation that he be bound by such factors. Such a contractual
obligation may not be uncommon in a collective bargaining agree-
ment made by a private employer with his employees; but private em-
ployers are not subject to § 97A or any other comparable limitations
on the authority to assign and control their personnel.
... In making assignments the chief must exercise his own discre-
tion and judgment as to the number, qualifications and identity of
officers needed for particular situations at any given time. He clearly
has been given that authority by § 97A, and we cannot believe that
the Legislature, in enacting provisions for collective bargaining by
municipal employees, meant to take that authority away from the
chief and permit the selectmen to bargain it away under the guise
of negotiations on 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment.' To deprive the chief of his authority to assign his
officers to their respective duties and to substitute therefor the dis-
puted provisions of the agreement would be totally subversive of the
discipline and efficiency which is indispensible to a public law en-
forcement agency. Thus, we conclude that those articles of the agree-
ment which impinge upon the power and authority of the chief to
decide duty, vacation and leave assignments are null and void as
to members of the police department.-
The court's holding in this case is a tacit rejection of public sector
collective bargaining. There cannot be any collective bargaining if
the employer (the selectmen) lacks the authority to bargain with the
union over vacation and job preference. This case graphically illustrates
how the diffusion of managerial authority in the public sector has im-
peded collective bargaining. Since the courts and state agencies can-
not identify the "real employer," 7 they constantly strive to reach a
practical accommodation between the collective bargaining statutes
56. 258 N.E.2d at 535-37.
57. See note 3 supra.
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and other more general statutes and ordinances pertaining to the ope-
ration of government. It can be argued, however, that in Dracut the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had no alternative, since the
collective bargaining statute is specifically subordinated to other state
laws. 58 If that is in fact true, then collective bargaining will forever
remain illusory in Massachusetts.
Arguably, the structure of state and local government makes it
impossible to prohibit the non-employing agencies from enacting rules
and regulations that have an impact on terms and conditions of em-
ployment. The interrelationship and overlapping functions of such
governmental agencies are too great and complex to permit the "im-
mediate employers" to bargain with the unions over everything that
affects working conditions. Consequently, each agency that has the
authority to affect terms and conditions of employment must be made
responsive to the rights of the employees to bargain over those matters.
As a suggested minimum, each agency should be required to consult
with the unions before implementing rules and regulations that affect
organized employees.
How then can the diffusion of authority problem be resolved to give
meaning to "working conditions," while still permitting state and
local governments to perform their obligations to the public? Initially,
the states should revise their public employees collective bargaining
statutes with full recognition of the problem in mind. Any new statutes
must indicate clearly what matters are beyond the scope of bargaining
and what matters are reserved to the prerogative of public officials
and the political process. Such action will be useless unless the states
approach the problem objectively and with a clear intent to foster col-
lective bargaining. Then, only a few issues will be beyond the bargain-
ing process, and even these matters will not be unilaterally implement-
ed if they have a substantial impact on the working conditions of
represented employees.
At least two states have attempted to resolve the problem inherent
in the diffusion of authority that exists in the public sector. In Maine
the collective bargaining statute provides for both "pure collective
bargaining" and "meet and confer." 59 Under the statute, the employer
must bargain with the union over all matters pertaining to working
conditions if to do so would not subvert the political process. If the
matters in issue affect public policy more than "working conditions,"
they are not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining; nevertheless,
the employers are obligated to "meet and confer" with the union before
58. Cf. Norton Teachers Ass'n v. Town of Norton, 279 N.E.2d 659 (Mass. 1972).
59. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965(I)(c) (Supp. 1972).
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instituting any changes that affect their employees. Hence the unions
are given an opportunity to discuss with the employers alternative
ways of implementing any new policies or rules that are enacted by
the absent employer. Moreover, the employers and the unions can
make joint recommendations to the appropriate agency suggesting
ways to alter the new policies or procedures.
Additionally, under the Maine statute, the role of the civil ser-
vice commission has been drastically reduced.60 Its function is limited
to formulating, administering and interpreting employment examina-
tions. Hence, one major problem in public sector labor relations may
have been put to rest-the right of the civil service commission to
formulate rules pertaining to employment.
Hawaii has gone one step further than Maine. The Hawaii collec-
tive bargaining statute attempts to bring all parties to the bargaining
table. After explicitly identifying the public employer,61 the statute
specifically states who is directly obligated to bargain with the em-
ployees' representative. 62 Presumably, the fact that every arm of govern-
ment is involved in the negotiations precludes the public employer
from formulating or supporting any legislation that is inconsistent with
the collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, though the statute
clearly defines which issues are beyond the "scope of negotiations," 63
the parties are still obligated to "meet and confer" on such excluded
items where they have an impact on working conditions. In part, the
statute provides the following:
Except as otherwise provided herein, all matters affecting em-
ployee relations, including those that are, or may be, the subject
of a regulation promulgated by the employer or any personnel di-
rector, are subject to consultation with the exclusive representatives
of the employees concerned. The employer shall make every reason-
able effort to consult with the exclusive representatives prior to
effecting changes in any major policy affecting employee relations.64
60. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 969 (Supp. 1972).
61. HAWAn REV. STAT. § 89-2(9) (Supp. 1973) defines the employer as
the governor in the case of the State, the respective mayors in the case of the
city and county of Honolulu and the counties of Hawaii, Maui and Kauai,
the board of education in case of the department of education, and the board
of regents in the case of the university of Hawaii, and any individual who represents
one of these employers or acts in their interest in dealing with public employees.
(Emphasis added.) Properly construed, this provision could eliminate the identity
problem which has retarded collective bargaining in the public sector. More importantly,
it resolves the "absent employer" problem because it compels state and local legislators
and the civil service commission to participate in the negotiation.
62. See HAwAn REv. STAT. § 89-6(b) (Supp. 1973).
63. See HAWAII REv. STAT. § 89-9(d) (Supp. 1973).
64. HIwAi Ray. STAT. § 89-9(c) (Supp. 1973).
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This language appears sufficient to eliminate much of the conflict
that exists within the public sector regarding the scope of bargaining.
A second approach to the problem of the scope of bargaining would
be to adopt a general collective bargaining agreement setting forth
in detail the purpose of the statute. Thus, if it becomes clear that the
legislature intends to provide a pragmatic and comprehensive scheme
permitting collective bargaining, the state labor board can harmonize
the labor statute with other legislative provisions. This would pro-
hibit state labor boards and state courts from automatically assuming
that the specific statute providing for public sector collective bargaining
is subordinate to other general statutes regulating state and municipal
affairs.65 Confronted with this scheme the state labor boards and the
courts would resolve any statutory conflict on a case-by-case basis with
clear legislative guidelines regarding the weight to be given to general
legislative enactments that are inconsistent with the collective bargain-
ing statute . 6
While a legislative resolution of the statutory conflict is desirable,
legislative inaction is not always fatal. Many state labor boards and
courts have attempted to resolve the conflict between the collective
bargaining statute and general legislation. A good example of the
approach can be seen by examining the Michigan collective bargain-
ing statute and the decisions by MERC. In at least two specific
instances, MERC has held that the labor statute takes precedence
over other general legislation that tends to infringe upon the em-
ployees' right to engage in collective bargaining. In City of Flint67
MERC held that the City of Flint could not rely on a general statute
authorizing a home rule charter to avoid its obligation to bargain
with the majority union.68 Thus, the Commission held that the city
could not institute a change in the prevailing wage rates without bar-
gaining with the union. Similarly, in City of Detroit the Commission
held that the existence of a home rule charter provision did not relieve
the employer of its obligation to bargain with the union regarding
residency requirements and a pension retirement plan. MERC ruled
in favor of the union in spite of a city charter provision which obligat-
ed the employer to present any change in the existing pension plan to
the electorate by way of a referendum. 70 Through these cases, the
65. See notes 51-56 and accompanying text supra.
66. Hawaii has resolved this problem by specifically providing that the collective
bargaining statute has priority over all conflicting legislation. See HAWAII REV. STAT. §
89-19 (Supp. 1973).
67. 5 Mich. E.R.C. Lab. Op. 348 (1970).
68. Id. at 349.
69. 6 Mich. E.R.C. Lab. Op. 237 (1971).
70. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 117.5(d) (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
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Michigan Commission served notice on public employers that they
could not hide behind general statutory law to avoid their obligation
to bargain with the union concerning mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining.
The above cases illustrate a practical attempt by one state to
harmonize general statutory law with specific legislation providing for
collective bargaining. In reaching the decisions, the Commission relied
on general principles of statutory construction. Its task was further
facilitated by earlier decisions in the Michigan Supreme Court regard-
ing statutory conflict.71
B. Contract Administration
The consummation of a collective bargaining agreement does not
terminate the relationship between the employer and the union in
the private sector. 2 That same rationale is applicable to public sector
collective bargaining. The contract is not self-implementing. There is
a continuous need for both the union and the employer to have some-
one at the job site to give meaning to the agreement and to apply its
terms to different problems and questions that arise thereunder. Most
of the "real employers" have several operations, which makes it im-
possible for the managerial officials to be constantly present at each
job site. The need remains, however, to have an employee who owes
his primary loyalty to the employer at each job site to administer the
agreement for the employer.
In the private sector, the collective bargaining agreement is ad-
ministered by the foremen or other supervisory officials of the em-
ployer. The function has been deemed so vital in the private sector
that the NLRB will not hesitate to find that the union committed an
unfair labor practice if it attempts to interfere with the employer's
agent in the administration of the collective bargaining agreement.3
In both the public and the private sector, the unions nominate stewards
to represent them at the job sites. It is the stewards' job to represent
the employees in interpreting the collective bargaining agreement.
Therefore, the public sector employer is at a decided disadvantage in
contract administration if it does not have someone permanently at
the job site to interpret the agreement.
71. E.g., Antrim County Social Welfare Bd. v. Lapeer County Social Welfare Bd.,
50 N.W.2d 769 (Mich. 1952); Winter v. Shafter, 26 N.W.2d 893 (Mich. 1947).
72. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
73. E.g., Mailers' Union No. 18, 172 N.L.R.B. 2173 (1968). The Board found that
the union committed an unfair labor practice in pressing intra-union charges against
a union member supervisor for acts committed in his capacity as a supervisor.
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While the need for management officials at the job site is obvious,
some states have taken the position that employers can administer
the agreement without any job site officials. The New York statute
provides that all employees except managerial officials shall be includ-
ed in the bargaining unit.7 4 In Board of Education, Beacon Enlarged
City School District75 PERB held that principals and assistant principals
should be included in the same bargaining unit with other non-super-
visory employees. In reaching that decision, PERB gave a very narrow
interpretation to the statute. It reasoned that the principals were
eligible to vote in the unit because they did not formulate policy, or
"assist directly in the preparation for and conduct of collective negotia-
tions," or play a "major role" in administering the agreement.76 Ac-
cordingly, they were not managerial officials within the meaning of the
New York statute. A narrow interpretation of the statute may be com-
patible with the intent of the New York Legislature, but the decision
appears inconsistent with the concept of collective bargaining. The in-
clusion of principals and assistant principals in a non-supervisory
employees bargaining unit causes problems for both management
and labor. For example, the school board employer is deprived of the
right to consult in confidence with the only individuals who could
render advice on the feasibility of union demands, while the union
must keep the principal and his assistant informed of their tactics and
procedures, including slowdowns or work stoppages. Consequently, by
failing to provide parties on both sides to administer the contract, the
PERB decision permits a result incompatible with traditional con-
cepts of the supervisory function in contract administration.
There are many examples of courts and agencies that have failed
to realize that resolving grievances under the consummated agreement
is a continuation of collective bargaining. In PLRB v. Eastern Lancaster
County School District7 7 the board specifically held that "first level
supervisors" were not engaged in collective bargaining because they
did not participate in the actual negotiation of the labor agreement.78
The board also held that processing and settling of grievances was
not an extension of collective bargaining.
79
If state agencies and state courts are de-emphasizing the need for
continued negotiations by including supervisory employees in units
74. N.Y. CIv. S Rv. LAWS § 201(7) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
75. 4 N.Y.P.E.R.B. 4344 (1971).
76. Id. at 4349-50; accord, Union Free School Dist. No. 13, 4 N.Y.P.E.R.B. 4310
(1971).
77. G.E.R.R. No. 477, at B-6 (Pa. L.R.B. Nov. 6, 1972).
78. Id. at B-7.
79. Id.
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with the rank and file employees, what factors are determinative of
who shall be included in a bargaining unit? This question was raised
and answered in Clifford W. Beers Guidance Clinic. ° When the union
filed an election petition seeking a unit of eighteen employees, in-
cluding four supervisors, the employers contested the unit sought on
the theory that, under the statute, supervisory employees were not
eligible to vote in an election with non-supervisory employees. Even
though the Connecticut Labor Board concluded that the state act
was similar to the NLRA, it held that the supervisors should be in-
cluded in the unit with the rank and file employees.8' The Connecticut
Board completely disregarded the grievance aspect of collective bar-
gaining. Rather, it stressed that all employees with a community of
interest should be included in the same bargaining unit. To support
its conclusion that the supervisory and non-supervisory employees had
a community of interest, the Board stressed that the relationship be-
tween the supervisors and non-supervisors was "intimate" and that
there were no objections from the rank and file employees to the in-
clusion of the supervisors . 2 Consequently, in the opinion of the Con-
necticut Board, the decisive factor in unit determination questions is
the relationship between the respective groups of employees prior to
the organizing campaign. 3 The Board, however, noted that it had
some misgivings about the functions and propriety of such a unit.
The misgivings of the Connecticut Board were justifiable. When
supervisors and non-supervisors are included in the same unit, it is
difficult to achieve harmonious labor relations. The increase in the
possibility of conflict and the decrease in the opportunity for har-
monious collective bargaining is illustrated by the case of City of Stam-
ford.8 4 Supervisory and non-supervisory employees were included in
the same bargaining unit, with the chief of police excluded as an
official of management. The chief was not available for consultation
during negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, and the city
legislature asked a captain in the department to sit with management
at the negotiating table. The captain refused to comply with the request
on the basis that to do so would be similar to negotiating against him-
self. The city then ordered the employee to act as a consultant for
management. Following these events the union filed an unfair labor
practice charge against the employer. The Connecticut Board held that
80. G.E.R.R. No. 493, at B-11 (Conn. Bd. Lab. Rel. March 5, 1973).
81. Id. at B-12, -13.
82. Id. at B-13, -14.
83. Id.
84. G.E.R.R. No. 472, at B-5 (Conn, Bd. Lab. Rel, Oct. 2, 1972),
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the employer's action constituted an unfair labor practice. In reaching
its decision the Board disregarded the employer's contention that
technically the captain was a supervisor and an official of manage-
ment.88 In the opinion of the Board, an employer could not compel the
employee to negotiate against his unit.86
City of Stamford illustrates the problem inherent in the inclusion
of supervisors and the supervised employees in the same bargaining
unit. Moreover, it illustrates how management depends upon its
supervisors for detailed information and consultation during the bar-
gaining process. Consequently, if public sector bargaining is to accom-
modate the conflicting needs and desires of the parties, state statutes
must adopt the preclusions of the NLRA. 7
When a public employer allows or is compelled by state law to
allow his supervisors to join a union, he may expect difficulty in collec-
tive bargaining. First, the supervisory employees in the bargaining
unit with other employees are forced to choose between allegiance to
the union or to the employer. If such employees opt for the union,
then the employer has no one at the job site to represent its interest in
resolving the day-to-day problems that arise under the contract. On the
other hand, if they opt for the employer, it is possible they will retard
the efforts of the non-supervisory employees in forming or joining a
union. As union members, the supervisory employees may engage in
surveillance of other union members. That mere possibility has an in-
timidating effect on the rank and file employees. Secondly, the super-
visory employees may be unduly influenced by the union. As with the
high school principals in Beacon Enlarged City School District, such
employees may permit the union to unduly influence them in pre-
paring budgets and in making other recommendations. Finally, and
most importantly, to bargain intelligently the employer needs someone
at the job site who can apprise its negotiators of the more serious prob-
lems arising under the contract and suggest methods of resolution or
elimination in future negotiations with the union. By including super-
visors in the bargaining unit with other employees, the employer
stifles its most valuable channel for securing pre-negotiation informa-
tion. For these reasons supervisory employees should be excluded from
the bargaining unit. Notwithstanding one author's observation that
"the line between supervisors and employees in the public sector is
not nearly so clear as it is in the private sector," and that "the interest
85. Id. at B-6
86. Id.
87. Supervisory employees are excluded from the protection of the National Labor
Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
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of the supervisors and the rank and file are closely entwined, if not
identical,"88 use of the criteria relied upon in the private sector to
identify supervisors could facilitate the task of public sector employ-
ers.89 It is not difficult to determine if an employee directs other em-
ployees, or if other employees and the employer look upon him as a
supervisor. Since the hiring, firing and promotion of most public sector
employees are determined by civil service rules and regulations, how-
ever, the private sector's requirement that a supervisor have the au-
thority to hire and fire should be eliminated.
The problem inherent in including employees with supervisory
authority in the bargaining unit with other employees, and the need
to recognize their individual loyalty to the employer, has been
recognized in New York. In Union Free School District Number 5,90
PERB reversed its earlier narrow definition of managerial officials,
announced in Beacon Enlarged City School District,9 1 and denied
principals and assistant principals the right to join a union. Based
upon the detailed testimony of the school superintendent," PERB
concluded that the principals and their assistants played a major role
in the preparation for negotiation and the administration of the com-
pleted agreement. 3 The Board considered these activities management-
oriented and found that the collective bargaining process was better
served by excluding the principals and their assistants from the bar-
gaining unit.9 4
If supervisory employees may not be included in bargaining units
with non-supervisory employees, is the former's right to bargain col-
lectively extinguished? The broad language of the state constitutions
and statutes would indicate that the right remains. 95 The single
measure taken by most states has been to preclude the mixing of super-
visory and non-supervisory employees in the same unit. 6 Permitting
88. Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 DuQ. L.
REV. 357, 368 (1972).
89. National Labor Relations Act § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970), defines a
supervisor as an
individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay-off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effective-
ly to recommend such action ....
90. 5 N.Y.P.E.R.B. 4043 (1972).
91. 4 N.Y.P.E.R.B. 4344 (1971). See p. 300 supra.
92. 5 N.Y.P.E.R.B. at 4046.
93. Id. at 4047.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 6; N.Y. CONsr. art. I, § 17; MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 423.8 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.401 (Supp. 1973).
96. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-6(a) (Supp. 1973).
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supervisory employees to form their own bargaining unit would solve
some of the problems in contract negotiation and give effect to the
supervisory employees' right to bargain. In the event of a strike,
7
however, the employer may find that his unionized supervisors refuse
to cross the picket line established by non-supervisory employees. One
solution to this problem would be for public employers to adopt the
private sector concept of a supervisory employee. In the private sector,
these individuals are precluded from joining a union, and their initial
and continued loyalty is to the employer. This suggestion may raise
more problems than it solves, but appears preferable to unionizing
supervisors.
III. BARGAINING UNIT FRAGMENTATION
Fragmentation of bargaining units means that the unions and em-
ployers have carved several bargaining units out of a group of em-
ployees that have a common interest and could logically be included
in one large unit. As one commentator has observed, this practice can
cause serious problems:
The more bargaining units public management deals with, the
greater the chance that competing unions will be able to whipsaw
the employer. Moreover, a multiplicity of bargaining units makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to maintain some semblance of uni-
formity in benefits and working conditions. Unfortunately, in many
states and localities bargaining units have been established without
consideration of the effect such units will have on negotiations or
on the subsequent administration of an agreement.98
The purpose of this section is to discuss the factors that gave rise
to unit fragmentation in the public sector, and to discuss the effect
fragmentation has on the process of collective bargaining. Additionally,
the action taken by some states to eliminate excessive bargaining unit
fragmentation will be examined. Unit fragmentation in the public
sector arose because of several factors. First, the states enacting public
97. The debate over whether public employees should be allowed to strike continues.
In the interim, public employees have engaged in strikes with and without the presence
of statutes prohibiting work stoppages. For a general discussion of the issues, see
Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MicH. L. REV.
943 (1969); Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10
DUQ. L. REV. 357 (1972); Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MicH. L. REV. 931
(1969); Stevens, The Management of Labor in the Public Sector, 51 ORE. L. REv. 191
(1971).
98. Shaw & Clark, Determination of Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Public
Sector: Legal and Practical Problems, 51 ORE. L, REV, 151, 152 (1971) (footnote omitted).
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sector labor relations laws attempted to model them, to a great extent,
after the NLRA 9 The NLRB policy regarding unit determination
was designed to permit the greatest degree of employee participation
in the designation of the bargaining agent and to encourage participa-
tion in union affairs.loo The implementation of this policy resulted
in the presumption that a single plant or single store was the most ap-
propriate unit.1 1
The Wisconsin Municipal Employees statute illustrates the adop-
tion by a public employer of the NLRB approach. This statute pro-
vides:
In making such a determination [appropriateness of a particular
bargaining unit], the commission may decide whether, in a particular
case, the employes in the same or several departments, divisions,
institutions, crafts, professions or other occupational groupings con-
stitute a unit. Before making its determination, the commission
may provide an opportunity for the employes concerned to deter-
mine, by secret ballot, whether or not they desire to be established
as a separate collective bargaining unit.102
This portion of the Wisconsin statute also charges the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission (WERC) to avoid, wherever
possible, the fragmentation of bargaining units. 10 3 As a result of en-
couraging employee participation in the selection of a union, it is
conceivable that a bargaining unit, to some extent, may be deter-
mined by the union's organizational activity. In the private sector, a
bargaining unit determined by the extent and intensity of the union's
organizational campaign has been specifically rejected."0 Naturally,
there is no reason for the unions to attempt to organize in one cam-
paign all those employed by a municipality. Rather, the unions could
complete unionization by successively organizing small units of em-
99. See, e.g., MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.1-.311 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 179.61-.77 (Supp. 1974); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW §§ 200-14 (McKinney 1973); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-2301 (Supp. 1973); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.01-.97 (1974).
100. See Parsons Investment Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 192 (1965); Morand Bros. Beverage
Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950).
I01. Marks Oxygen Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 228, 230 (1964).
102. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4) (d) (2a) (1974).
103. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (4) (d) (2a) (1974).
104. National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (5) (1970), provides,
inter alia, that the extent to which employees have organized shall not be used as the
controlling factor in bargaining unit determination. See NLRB v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438 (1965); NLRB v. Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 690 (4th
Cir. 1963).
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ployees. Because the statute allows the unions to organize small
groups, unit fragmentation in Wisconsin is common practice.
10 5
The second factor that has resulted in excessive bargaining unit
fragmentation in the public sector has been the failure or inability
of unions and employers to identify the "real employer." Both parties
have attempted to identify the employer by payroll records and job
classification, completely ignoring similar interests and goals among
groups of employees. 106
Unit fragmentation has operated to the employer's detriment for
three reasons. First, it has prevented employers from making the most
effective use of their work forces, for example, by transferring em-
ployees from one job classification to another and by promoting em-
ployees to higher paying positions within the job classification. While
this problem is extremely complex when one union represents several
units of employees performing the same type of work, the employer's
problem becomes even more acute when the various units of em-
ployees are represented by different unions. 107
Secondly, the presence of several unions within one installation has
resulted in inflated wages for public employees. As each union attempts
to increase its membership and sphere of influence, it naturally tends
to concentrate its efforts in areas where the results are most visible-
increased wages and fringe benefits. As a result, the employer is con-
fronted with continually escalating demands for higher wages and
greater benefits. The employer may attempt to minimize this effect by
bargaining simultaneously with all the unions; however, such group
bargaining may become unmanageable before agreement on a new
contract is reached. 0 8
105. See Shaw & Clark, supra note 98, at 154-56.
106. See, e.g., Lansing School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 7 Mich. E.R.C. Lab. Op. 264
(1972). MERC held that all adult-education teachers constituted one bargaining unit
and that regular kindergarten through twelfth grade teachers constituted a separate
unit.
107. See Shaw & Clark, supra note 98, at 174. In Herman Keifer Hospital, 7 Mich.
E.R.C. Lab Op. 685 (1972), 12 separate unions represented 450 non-supervisory employees
of a public health complex. As the city phased out the operation of a communicable
disease center, it transferred employees represented by one union to a unit within the com-
plex where employees were represented by another union. All of the employees in-
volved performed similar work in the separate departments of the complex. In the
face of an unfair labor practice charge filed by the union whose members were being
transferred, MERC upheld the employer's ability to effect the transfers even though
the result would be decimation of the charging union. 7 Mich. E.R.C. Lab. Op. at 696.
MERC also found that the organization of employees by specific job classification in each
department of the hospital, rather than by generic function throughout the complex,
was the primary cause of the overlapping bargaining units. 7 Mich. E.R.C. Lab. Op. at
695. The case illustrates the complex problems presented when two unions represent em-
ployees who do similar work.
108. See Shaw & Clark, supra note 98, at 174 n.148.
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Finally, with the appearance of the traditional private sector unions
in public sector collective bargaining, the small bargaining unit
strategy works against the employer. In times of industrial warfare,
there is a great deal of assistance between unions, often manifested
by one union's refusal to cross a valid picket line of a sister union. Mu-
tual assistance between unions has permitted small units of employees
to exert a degree of influence incompatible with their actual bargain-
ing strength. As a practical matter, each small unit of employees has
sufficient power to bring the employer's operation to a virtual stand-
still. Since the collective bargaining agreements may expire at different
times, the public employer may be confronted with several major in-
terruptions during the course of a year.
Naturally, the deleterious effects of unit fragmentation in public
sector bargaining are being reconsidered by some states. Many states
are attempting to enlarge the scope of the bargaining units by
statute. 109 In Hawaii, for example, the statute provides that all state
and municipal employees be organized into a maximum of 13 bar-
gaining units. 10 Some state legislatures, however, have failed to take
any action regarding the unit fragmentation problem. The task of
enlarging the bargaining units has been thrust upon the state labor
relations boards. In Township of West Bloomfield Police Depart-
ment' MERC dismissed a union's petition requesting a unit of six
dispatchers in the police department. It held that because the dis-
patchers performed a great deal of clerical work, they were akin to
secretaries. Observing that there were other unrepresented secretaries
in the building, MERC concluded that an appropriate unit would be
all secretaries employed in the building.112 Similarly, in Albion Com-
munity Hospital"3 MERC dismissed a petition that sought to separate
the licensed practical nurses from a large unit of nurses. It held that
the unit sought to be established was not coextensive with the certified
appropriate bargaining unit." 4
Moreover, MERC has rejected job classifications as a relevant factor
in determining an appropriate bargaining unit. In Eastern Michigan
University 15 a combination of the teaching faculty and non-teaching
109. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.604 (Supp. 1973). In pertinent part, the
statute provides that the state labor relations board should consider employees' mutual
interests in determining bargaining units, but the board is instructed to create units
corresponding to the employer's organization of the employees.
110. HAWAIu REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-6(a) (Supp. 1973).
111. 7 Mich. E.R.C. Lab. Op. 344 (1972).
112. Id. at 346.
113. 7 Mich. E.R.C. Lab. Op. 614 (1972).
114. Id. at 616-18.
115. 7 Mich. E.R.C. Lab. Op. 11 (1972).
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academic faculty was found to be the most appropriate bargaining
unit. In reaching that conclusion, MERC applied an integration of
work test. The Commission was of the opinion that the successful exe-
cution of the University's function required that all the faculty work
together, notwithstanding the fact that they had different job classi-
fications. In Michigan State Universityt 6 MERC relied on the inte-
gration test and rejected the union's attempt to fragment employees
of the University's physical facilities. MERC held that job classifica-
tions were not determinative, and that the appropriate unit was all
employees employed in the operation and maintenance of the Uni-
versity's physical plant.
In New York, PERB has taken the same position with respect to
unit fragmentation as was taken in Michigan by MERC. In Copiague
Public Schools1 7 PERB, in refusing to certify a union as the exclusive
bargaining agent, held that if employees had a "community of
interest"'1 " the union could not fragment them. Moreover, PERB held
that the employees had a community of interest because they all re-
ceived civil service benefits. This case is significant because PERB
was willing to create a presumption of community of interest among
all employees employed under civil service rules and regulations.""
In effect, this shifted to the union the burden of proving that the
employees sought to be organized did not have a community of interest
with a larger group of employees.
It is not enough to prove that the work rules or educational quali-
fications of the employees are dissimilar. To sustain its burden the
union must offer some evidence which indicates that there is some
real conflict among the various groups of employees, and that the
conflict is so intense that it is virtually impossible for one union to
represent the employees' interests at the bargaining table.
20
While the labor relations boards in both Michigan and New York
have taken steps to enlarge the bargaining units, neither has aban-
doned the community of interest requirement. However, both have
116. 1 Mich. E.R.C. Lab. Op. 176, 177 (1966); County Service Center, I Mich.
E.R.C. Lab. Op. 112 (1966).
117. 5 N.Y.P.E.R.B. 4034 (1972).
118. See note 122 and accompanying text infra, discussing the "community of in-
terest" doctrine.
119. 5 N.Y.P.E.R.B. at 4035. See also Union Free School Dist. No. 13, 4 N.Y.P.E.R.B.
4310 (1971). In School District No. 13, PERB held that in determining an appropriate
unit and community interest, the factors considered include negotiating authority of
the employer and the employer's ability to provide quality service to the public. It
attempts to define the broadest possible unit which will permit an employer to exercise
its negotiating authority, but yet provide a service to the public. Id. at 4333-4.
120. Board of Cooperative Educational Services, 4 N.Y.P.E.R.B. 4338 (1971).
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begun to view the community of interest differently than they did in
the early stages of their operation. Under the current scheme, com-
munity of interest is determined by either the integration of the em-
ployer's work or its fringe benefit plan.' Both factors de-emphasize
job classifications.
What Is a Community of Interest?
Community of interest is a difficult concept to define. Over the
years it has been developed and relied upon by the NLRB to deter-
mine which employees should be included in an appropriate bar-
gaining unit. The Board will not find that a community of interest
exists if certain factors are not present. The requisite factors are: (1)
functional integration of work process; (2) common supervision of
employees; (3) similar skills of employees; (4) interchangeability of
employees; (5) a common scheme of fringe benefits offered to the
employees. 12 2 Thus it is apparent that the new position taken by MERC
and PERB represents an adoption of the NLRB's initial definition
of community of interest.
The NLRB, however, has gradually broadened its definition of the
most appropriate unit. In doing so it has not abandoned the com-
munity of interest requirement. In its search for a community of in-
terest, the Board has begun to place primary emphasis on factors
different from those used in the mid-1960's. In Gray Drug Stores, Inc., 13
for example, the Board rejected the union's contention that a multi-
store, countywide unit was appropriate. A Board majority there held
that the appropriate unit was all stores within a two-county area. In
reaching that decision it relied on the following factors: (1) function-
al integration of the employer's operation; (2) interchange of em-
ployees' supervision; and (3) geographical proximity. On these bases
the Board held that the appropriate unit should be coextensive with
the employer's administrative entity, which was all stores within a
two-county area.
Gray Drug Stores clearly illustrates that the NLRB has de-
veloped a broader notion of community of interest. The emphasis is
no longer placed on the employees and their right to participate in
internal union affairs or internal harmony within the union. Under
the new scheme the important factors are managerial control and the
administration of labor relations. If there is local management, the
121. See notes 111-20 and accompanying text supra.
122. See Curcie Brothers, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 380 (1964); Sylvania Electric Products,
Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 768 (1962).
123. 80 L.R.R.M. 1449 (1972); accord, Twenty-First Century Restaurant Corp., 192
N.L.R.B. 881 (1971); Waiakamilo Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 878 (1971).
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NLRB may very well find that a single plant constitutes an appropriate
unit.'2 4 If the managerial control is centralized and the employer
operates several outlets, the unit will be broader than one plant, store
or installation.
Some states have enacted legislation ensuring the same results re-
garding appropriate units that have emerged in the private sector. Both
Pennsylvania and New York have statutes1" 5 that will have this effect if
the public employees labor relations commissions, in their decisions,
give greater consideration to managerial control. Hence, in a school
district where there is only one superintendent and one administra-
tive office, the bargaining unit would be district-wide.
Hawaii, however, currently offers the best model for determining
bargaining units. Under its statute, bargaining units along depart-
mental, occupational or even installation lines are prohibited. There
cannot be more than 13 bargaining units in the state. The unit is
coextensive with the employer that has the ultimate control over the
employees. Clearly, the position taken in Hawaii dictates a much
broader unit than is required by the NLRB. While the standards
established by the NLRB for determining unit composition are sig-
nificant indicators of the appropriateness of a given unit, it is submitted
that the approach taken in Hawaii is more compatible with the prob-
lems present in the public sector.
IV. CONCLUSION
In recent years there has been a significant attitudinal change by
public employers and the general public with respect to public sector
collective bargaining. Public officials no longer look upon all forms
and degrees of collective bargaining as antagonistic to the well-being
of the political entity. Moreover, unions are encouraged to help public
management promote many political ideas to the electorate that are
totally unrelated to collective bargaining. Accordingly, the dispute
between public management and labor no longer concerns the
legitimacy of public employee unionism, but rather the schemes and
models necessary to facilitate orderly collective bargaining.
Despite the tacit agreement between public employer and union
on motives and goals it is apparent that public sector bargaining has
been retarded. The most compelling reasons are the inability of union
and employers to determine "what to bargain about" and "who to bar-
gain with." This state of confusion, coupled with legislative inaction
124. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 80 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1972).
125. See N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 207 (McKinney 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.-
604 (Supp. 1973).
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by the major states, will continue to cause some turbulence in public
sector labor relations.
It is suggested here that unless and until the collective bargaining
statutes identify both the "real employer" and the scope of bargain-
ing, unions and public employers will continue to encounter prob-
lems at the bargaining table. To resolve the problem of identification,
it is suggested that the statutes define the employer as "all governmental
entities which can by practice, or through rules and regulations, affect
any terms and conditions of employment." In many instances, this
statutory test would compel the state labor boards and courts to con-
clude that two or more governmental units constitute a joint em-
ployer. Use of the joint employer concept reduces the number of
disputes concerning "what to bargain about." The scope of bargaining
expands as the definition of employer is broadened. As a result, the
number of subjects deemed to be outside of the scope of bargaining
is reduced to a minimum.
An additional benefit of the joint employer approach is to eliminate
multi-stage bargaining. This abuse occurs where a court or state labor
board defines the employer as the immediate employing entity only,
and fails to include other agencies that affect terms and conditions of
employment. For example, the union will bargain an agreement with
the fire department or police department. Following the tentative
agreement, the union will petition the legislative body for additional
benefits. At the same time, the local employer is attempting to have
the legislative body reduce the concessions already granted to the union.
This disruptive tactic will virtually disappear if the employer is
properly defined, since the legislative branch, as joint employer, will
have participated directly in the bargaining process. Consequently,
there will be little need to renegotiate the agreement.
It is clear that unit fragmentation impedes collective bargaining
in the public sector. State labor boards and courts must begin to make
every reasonable effort to broaden the bargaining units, where to
do so is not prohibited by statute. In broadening the bargaining unit
there must be some balancing of the employees' rights to participate
in internal union affairs against the public interest in an orderly and
stable labor relations practice. To this end, the decision maker should
place primary reliance on the same factors which the NLRB con-
sidered important in Gray Drug Stores.12 6
126. 80 L.R.R.M. 1449 (1972); See p. 309 supra.
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